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 1 
On April 23, 2017, Kenneth Humphrey followed an elderly man into his home and 
demanded money—he left with seven dollars and a bottle of cologne.1 A few days later, 
Humphrey was arrested and a court ordered that he be held on $350,000 bail.2 However, 
Humphrey’s robbery netted him a total of five dollars—he did not have enough money to post 
$350,000 bail.3 He was an elderly African-American man with a criminal record and a history of 
drug addiction.4 While these traits disadvantaged him in the eyes of the criminal justice system, 
Humphrey also had one trait that would ultimately determine his sentence: he was poor. 
When Humphrey’s case eventually came before the California Court of Appeal, the court 
declared California’s money-bail system unconstitutional for penalizing the poor.5 The widely-
publicized nature of the case prompted the California legislature to react. On August 28, 2018, 
the legislature signed the California Money Bail Reform Act of 2017 (also known as “SB 10”) 
into law.6 As the first piece of legislation to completely abolish monetary bail,7 California’s SB 
10 is an unprecedented step forward in the struggle for bail reform, eliminating a bail system that 
puts an unfair “tax on poor people in California.”8 However, progressive movements for change 
often result in fierce counter-movements, and California’s bail reform movement will be no 
different.9 
                                                 
1 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
2 Id. at 519, 522. 
3 Id. at 522. 
4 See id. at 520. 
5 Id. at 530. 
6 Thomas Fuller, California is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html [https://perma.cc/88GA-WEN2]. 
7 Id. 
8 In 1979, the Governor of California declared in his State of the State Address that it was necessary for the 
Legislature to reform the bail system, which he said constituted an unfair “tax on poor people in California. 
Thousands and thousands of people languish in the jails of this state even though they have been convicted of no 
crime. Their only crime is that they cannot make the bail that our present law requires.” Governor Edmund G. 
Brown Jr., State of the State Address, Jan. 16, 1979. However, the Legislature did not respond. See In re Humphrey, 
228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 516 (Ct. App. 2018). 
9 See Fuller, supra note 6. 
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This Note addresses the arguments that will likely be raised against SB 10 and provides a 
response to these challenges. Part I discusses the historical background of monetary bail, the bail 
reform movement in both the federal and state forums, and the beginning of the current bail 
reform movement in California. Part II addresses the main legal and policy challenges against 
SB 10, showing how the greatest threats to SB 10 come from policy challenges, rather than legal 
challenges. Part III looks at the big picture, discussing the pitfalls of pretrial incarceration and 
the possibility that SB 10 could create a regime of e-carceration. 
I. BAIL BACKGROUND  
A. Monetary Bail and Its Effects 
Two brothers and a lawyer walk into a bar. 
In 1896, the two McDonough brothers realized they could earn quite a profit by posting 
bail money as a favor to a lawyer who frequented their father’s saloon in San Francisco.10 They 
began charging a fee for this service and their side business became a huge success, albeit a 
notorious one.10a In fact, the McDonough brothers’ business was so successful that it earned the 
nickname of “Old Lady of Kearny Street” who “furnished bail by the gross to bookmakers and 
prostitutes, kept a taxi waiting at the door to whisk them out of jail and back to work.”11 The 
brothers inadvertently created America’s first bail bonding business, and thus the commercial 
money bail industry was born. 
                                                 
10 See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The Bail Book: A Comprehensive Look at Bail in America’s Criminal Justice 
System 165 (Cambridge 2018). Peter and Thomas McDonough posted bail money as a favor to lawyers who 
frequented their father’s bar and when the lawyers’ clients appeared in court, the brothers got their money back. 
Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2014), 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/bail-bond-prison-industry [https://perma.cc/LQ6S-2DCC]. 
10a Bauer, supra note 10. 
11 The Old Lady Moves On, TIME (Aug. 18, 1941), content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,802159,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/P8W9-6JE2]. 
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 What started as a lucky venture soon spread across the United States, producing a 
domino-like effect that transformed the criminal justice system.12 At first, commercial money 
bail simply allowed more defendants to obtain release from jail—it was a needed service for 
poor, friendless defendants who ordinarily would not have been able to make bail at all.13 
However, because bondsmen were making it more difficult to keep the accused behind bars 
before trial, judges began setting higher and higher bail amounts.14 Eventually, even defendants 
who could not afford the small bail amounts were given high bail amounts.15 By the 1940’s, bail 
amounts nationwide were high enough that many defendants had no choice but to pay a 
bondsman or wait in jail until trial.16  
 The commercial bail industry, and the bail system that became money-based rather than 
risk-based, became a gateway to a wider systemic issue: the cobweb criminal justice system in 
America. The web easily entraps and ensnares individuals who are poor, minorities, or otherwise 
marginalized in an endless cycle of crime and punishment. Individuals locked up for even a few 
days can lose their jobs, homes, or custody of their children, leading them into a cycle of crime 
in order to survive.16a The monetary bail system only exacerbates this cycle, and it has 
innumerable negative effects on both individual rights and society as a whole.  
The monetary bail system discriminates on the basis of wealth and turns justice into a 
“pay-for-play affair” where wealthy individuals can pay to go free, while indigent defendants are 
taken from their families and communities.17 Further, “detention, rather than other variables, has 
                                                 
12 See Baughman, supra note 10, at 165. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See id. 
16a See Thea L. Sebastian & Alec Karakatsanis, Challenging Money Bail in the Courts, 57 No. 3 Judges’ J. 23, 23 
(2018). 
17 Id. at 24. 
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been shown to causally affect trial outcomes.”18 For instance, defendants who are detained 
pretrial are significantly disadvantaged in court—detained defendants are 25% more likely to be 
convicted and 43% more likely to receive jail sentences.19 Mass incarceration rates are also 
affected by the bail system in that “[t]he political pressures of the criminal justice system reward 
judges for conservatism in making release and punishment decisions,”20 resulting in a trend of 
over-incarceration of pretrial detainees.  
Ultimately, in less than fifty years, the bail system changed from one that was risk-based 
to one that was wealth-based without any legislative or policy motivation.21 In the wake of this 
change, a cascade of negative consequences followed. The key to a successful reform of the bail 
system is in figuring out how to change the system back to the way it once was. 
B. Bail Reform in America 
 1. Federal Reforms 
Congress’s initial attempt to reform the federal bail system resulted in the Bail Reform 
Act of 1966 (“1966 Act”). The 1966 Act provided defendants with a statutory right to obtain 
release on bail.22 Congress clearly stated that its purpose of the legislation was, “to assure that all 
persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their 
appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the 
ends of justice nor the public interest.”23 Pretrial bail was not to be used as a means of protecting 
society against the “possible commission of additional crimes by the accused.”24 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Esmond Harmsworth, Bail and Detention: An Assessment and Critique of the Federal and Massachusetts Systems, 
22 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 220 (1996). 
21See Baughman, supra note 10, at 167. 
22 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-465 § 3146, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2295. 
24 Id.; see Baughman, supra note 10, at 166. 
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 The 1970’s and 1980’s saw a rise in crime rates, and a rise in tough-on-crime 
legislation.25 This attitude toward crime had a profound impact on attitudes toward bail, 
ultimately motivating Congress to pass the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”).26 In passing 
the 1984 Act, Congress noted its purpose was to address “the alarming problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release.”27 The 1984 Act essentially revised the 1966 Act to allow 
courts to impose conditions of release to ensure community safety.28 Specifically, the 1984 Act 
provided that, “the judicial officer [must] release the [defendant] on his own recognizance, or 
upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, unless the judicial officer determines that such 
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the 
safety of any other person or the community.”29 
The 1984 Act expanded the list of factors a judicial officer could consider in determining 
whether bail should be set in a particular case to include “the nature and seriousness of the 
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.”30 By 
allowing the court to consider a defendant’s potential for dangerousness, the 1984 Act added a 
rebuttable presumption of preventative detention if a defendant had committed certain offenses 
like violent crimes or serious drug crimes.31 The 1984 Act permitted courts to deny bail to 
                                                 
25 James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning of 
“Excessive” Bail, 25 J. L. & POL’Y 637, 653–55 (2017). 
26 Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 202 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988)); see Allen, 
supra note 25 at 685. 
27 S. REP. 98-225, 3, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. at 3195 (emphasis added). 
30 Baughman, supra note 10, at 166; see also Floralynn Einesman, How Long is Too Long? When Pretrial Detention 
Violates Due Process, 60 TENNESSEE L. REV. 1, 1 (1992) (noting that the Bail Reform Act authorized courts to 
consider a defendant’s flight risk and danger to community in setting bail).  
31 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b); see Keith Eric Hanson, When Worlds Collide: The Constitutional Politics of United States v. 
Salerno, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 155, 158 (1987). 
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defendants as a preventative measure,32 and this arguably contributed to the growing use of 
monetary bail in America.33  
The 1984 Act came under scrutiny in United States v. Salerno.34 The Salerno Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the 1984 Act,35 and emphasized that preventative detention must 
be “regulatory, not penal,” and must not constitute “impermissible punishment before trial.”36 
Further, the Court ruled that although the liberty interest of a presumptively innocent arrestee 
rises to the level of a fundamental constitutional right, preventative detention can be consistent 
with constitutional guarantees as long as there are robust procedural safeguards.37 These 
procedural safeguards must protect “the due process rights of the defendant and result in a 
finding that no less restrictive condition or combination of conditions can adequately assure the 
arrestee’s appearance in court and/or protect public safety, thereby demonstrating a compelling 
state interest warranting abridgment of an arrestee’s liberty prior to trial.”38 
In giving judges more factors to consider in the bail determination process, the 1984 Act 
sought to provide more reasons to grant pretrial release. Paradoxically, the additional factors 
enunciated in Salerno were not employed by the courts to effectuate more instances of pretrial 
release. Rather, they were employed as bases of new, legitimate reasons for ordering pretrial 
preventative detention.39  
                                                 
32 Ann M. Overbeck, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 CIN. L. REV. 153, 169 (1986); 
see Allen, supra note 25, at 685. 
33 See Baughman, supra note 10, at 166 
34 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987); see Allen, supra note 25, at 685. 
35 Id.; see In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
36 Id. at 746; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979) (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or 
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process 
of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee . . . [I]f a 
particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it 
does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”).  
37 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51.  
38 Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 526; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (“The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the 
circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.”). 
39 See Baughman, supra note 10, at 186. 
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2. State Reforms 
In recent years, the administration of bail in the criminal justice system has caused 
nationwide concern.40  Indeed, “[i]n 2017, state lawmakers in 46 states and the District of 
Columbia enacted 182 new pretrial laws—almost a 50 percent increase compared to 2015 and 
2016.”41 Many of the pretrial policy enactments that these state legislators passed dealt with the 
use or development of risk assessments in determinations of bail and release conditions.42 States 
also “modified who is eligible for release after arrest” and “amended pretrial release provisions 
by limiting the use of financial conditions in release decisions.”43  
The recent trend in bail reform follows in the footsteps of successful bail reform efforts 
such as those in Kentucky and Washington, D.C., where legislation mandated that the bail 
system rely on risk assessments rather than money bail.44 Indeed, Washington, D.C. has operated 
                                                 
40 Pretrial Detention Reform: Recommendations to the Chief Justice, Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup (2017), 
13; see, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, Judicial Responsibility for Pretrial Release Decisionmaking and the Information 
Role of Pretrial Services, 57 FED. PROBATION 28, 30 (1993) (discussing how “serious questions about the fairness 
and effectiveness of pretrial release” still remain even decades after bail reform went into effect); Timothy 
Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American 
Pretrial Reform (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2014) (discussing how recent pretrial 
reform initiatives have increased the visibility of the need for bail reform).  
41 National Conference of State Legislatures, Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation Update (April 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialEnactments_2017web_v02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NK3Q-DBJ8]. 
42 See id.  
43 Id. 
44 See  Frequently Asked Questions: Pretrial Detention Reform, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California 
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/frequently-asked-questions-pretrial-detention-reform 
[https://perma.cc/9355-34TT]. In Washington, D.C., defendants are not incarcerated pretrial if they cannot 
afford bail and they are not generally allowed to pay for release. See D.C. Code § 23-1321(c)(3). Kentucky, 
Washington, D.C., and other jurisdictions with robust pretrial programs that do not rely on financial guarantees also 
have low failure to appear rates. Frequently Asked Questions: Pretrial Detention Reform, supra.  
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an effective and successful pretrial system with almost no money bail for decades.45 In other 
states, such as New Mexico, legal action46 led to new bail reform efforts.47 
In 2017, New Jersey’s Criminal Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”)48 instituted “pretrial 
service agencies to conduct risk assessments, encourage nonmonetary release, and allow 
detention without bail for defendants deemed too dangerous or flight risks.”49 The legislation 
also provided for pretrial monitoring as a release option.50 Since the CJRA’s implementation, 
judicial officers have almost eliminated the use of monetary bail.51  
In February 2018, one year after the implementation of the CJRA, the New Jersey 
Judiciary issued a report to the Governor and the legislature summarizing the results of the CJRA 
and the successes and challenges the CJRA confronted since its implementation.52 According to 
preliminary statistics, the pretrial jail population experienced a significant decrease, declining 
from 8,894 pretrial detainees in 2015 to only 5,743 in 2018.53 Indeed, in 2017 alone, the pretrial 
                                                 
45 Having almost entirely eliminated money bail, D.C. releases 94% of defendants pretrial. See Harvard Law Review 
Association, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARVARD L. REV. 
1125, 1130 (2018). Further, 90% of defendants released pretrial make their court appointments, and 98% are not 
rearrested for a violent crime pretrial. Id. These appearance and public-safety rates are both surpass the national 
average. Id.  
46 State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014). 
47 The New Mexico Supreme Court created a task force to revamp the state’s bail scheme, and this task force later 
proposed a bail “amendment to the New Mexico Constitution prohibiting bail above what defendants can afford and 
expanding the power of judges to hold defendants without bail for dangerousness and risk of flight.” Kenechukwu 
Okocha, Nationwide Trend: Rethinking the Money Bail System, 90 WIS. L. 30, 34 (2017); see N. M. Const. Art II, § 
13. An initiative to revise the state’s constitutional provision addressing bail passed with 87% of the vote. New 
Mexico Legislature, Sen. Joint Res. No. 1 (2016), www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/files/CA1-SJM1-2016.pdf. The 
initiative provides for preventative detention on grounds of dangerousness or flight rusk under limited circumstances 
and prohibits detaining a defendant solely due to financial inability to post a money or property bond. Id. 
48 N.J. Legis. Senate S946. Reg Sess. 2014-2015 (2014). 
49 See Okocha, supra note 47, at 34.  
50 Pretrial Detention Reform, supra note 40 at 17. 
51 See New Jersey Courts Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, 
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/criminal/reform.html [https://perma.cc/RDD8-MRPA]; Lisa W. 
Foderaro, New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-system.html [https://perma.cc/A84U-JWBK]. 
52 Glenn A. Grant, 2017 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, 1, 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HMV-TAMV].   
53 Id. at 19. 
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jail population decreased 20 percent.54 Counting the time between 2015 and 2017, New Jersey’s 
pretrial detainee population has decreased by a total of 35 percent.55 
C. California’s Senate Bill No. 10 
In California, approximately two-thirds of the jail population—nearly 48,000 people—
are unsentenced.56 Further, California’s average bail is $50,000, more than five times the 
national average.57 These high bail amounts place an inordinate burden on the poor, given that 
47% of Americans lack even $400 for emergency expenses.58 Further, the bail system affects 
California taxpayers, who spend millions of dollars each day on housing the detainees awaiting 
trial.59 
For decades, criminal justice reform advocates unsuccessfully struggled to change the 
blackhole that was California’s bail system.59a However, in 2017, the bail reform movement 
gained a new momentum. In In re Humphrey, the California Court of Appeals held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to consider a defendant’s ability to pay, nonmonetary 
alternatives to money bail, and less restrictive conditions of release before ordering pretrial 
detention.60 The court stated that because the trial court set bail in an amount that was impossible 
for Humphrey to pay, despite having found him suitable for release on bail, the trial court’s order 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 The Board of State and Community Corrections’ annual Jail Profile Survey includes both people who are eligible 
for release but have not (or cannot) post money bail, and people who are not eligible for release. SB 10: Pretrial 
Release and Detention, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California, https://www.courts.ca.gov/pretrial.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S9PZ-QD38] (under “What percentage of the people held in California jails are unsentenced?” in 
Frequently Asked Questions). 
57  Kyle Harrison, SB 10: Punishment Before Conviction? Alleviating Economic Injustice in California with Bail 
Reform, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 533, 535 (2018). 
58Id. at 537–38. 
59 Id. at 535. 
59a See id. at 539.  
60 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
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constituted a “sub rosa detention order lacking the due process protections constitutionally 
required.”61  
The Humphrey court also referenced the Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup’s report,62 
which concluded that, “California’s current pretrial release and detention system unnecessarily 
compromises victim and public safety because it bases a person’s liberty on financial resources 
rather than the likelihood of future criminal behavior and exacerbates socioeconomic disparities 
and racial bias.”63 The substance of the report consists of 10 recommendations designed to 
establish and facilitate implementation of “a risk-based pretrial assessment and supervision 
system that (1) gathers individualized information so that courts can make release determinations 
based on whether a defendant poses a threat to public safety and is likely to return to court—
without regard for the defendant’s financial situation; and (2) provides judges with release 
options that are effective, varied, and fair alternatives to monetary bail.”64 Ultimately, the 
Humphrey opinion and the Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup’s report became the blueprint 
for a new wave of bail reform, and with the passage of SB 10, California became the first state to 
completely abolish its cash bail system.65 
II. LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES TO SB 10 
Notwithstanding SB 10’s laudatory goal to reform a discriminatory system of bail, the 
legislation has produced staunch critics, even from some unanticipated sources.65a Chief among 
                                                 
61 Id. at 517 (emphasis in original).  
62 Id. at 516; see Pretrial Detention Reform, supra note 40. 
63 Pretrial Detention Reform, supra note 40, at 1. 
64 Id. at 2. 
65 Fuller, supra note 6. 
65a See Lorelei Laird, ABA Weighs in on California Supreme Court Case Affecting State’s New Bail Reform Law, 
ABA J. (Oct. 10, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/bail_reformers_critical_of_california_bail_reform_law 
[https://perma.cc/GCJ2-KJSK] (noting that critics include the bail industry, public defenders, prosecutors, and 
criminal justice reformers). 
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the SB 10 critics, and not unexpectedly, is the bail bond industry. The bail bond industry is worth 
$2 billion,66 and facing the existential threat that SB 10 poses, bail bondsmen have declared that 
“[e]very single weapon in [their] arsenal will be fired” in order to block the law.67 
A. Legal Challenges to SB 10 
SB 10 opponents challenge the law’s inclusion of preventative detention on the grounds 
that it violates the constitutional right to bail.67a Although the U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly provide for a constitutional right to bail, case law leaves some room for argument 
regarding this ambiguity. However, a majority of state constitutions provide a right guaranteeing 
bail.68 
  1. Due Process 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”69 Relying 
on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, critics argue that pretrial detention deprives a person 
of their liberty and therefore violates the constitutional right to bail.69a However, in order to find 
that the right to bail is fundamental to due process, the Court must first find that the right is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “fundamental to our concept of 
                                                 
66 Jazmine Ulloa, California’s historic overhaul of cash bail is now on hold, pending a 2020 referendum, L. A. 
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-20190116-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/NY79-6RDL]. 
67 Laird, supra note 65a. 
67a See Fuller, supra note 6.  
68  As of 2009, forty-one state constitutions guaranteed the right to bail. Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand 
Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 267, 283–84 
(2009).  However, courts differ in their interpretations about whether state provisions protecting the right to bail are 
absolute or conditional. See id. at 276 (“[S]everal state constitutions only prohibit excessive bail without 
guaranteeing any right to bail. A majority of states, however, have adopted stronger protections than those secured 
by federal law, by guaranteeing a constitutional right to bail in noncapital cases.”).  
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
69a See California: Assembly Passes Senate Bill 10 “Bail Reform,” the Unconstitutional “Crappy Bill,” AMERICAN 
BAIL COALITION (Aug. 20, 2018), http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/in-the-news/california-assembly-passes-
senate-bill-10-bail-reform-the-unconstitutional-crappy-bill/ (“Californians have a “right to bail” and that’s 
something no Assembly vote can change.”). 
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constitutionally ordered liberty.”70 In this context, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether 
the right to bail satisfies this standard,71 leaving the issue open for determination in the future.72 
This ambiguity poses a potential problem for SB 10: does a bail reform law abolishing monetary 
bail infringe on a constitutional right to bail? 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a due process challenge to a piece of bail 
reform legislation.73 Holland v. Rosen is a putative class action brought by a bail bond company 
and a defendant subject to the pretrial release conditions of home detention and electronic 
monitoring after being charged with aggravated assault.74 The plaintiffs contended that the CJRA 
violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to allow defendants to 
provide cash bail as an alternative to non-monetary release conditions.75 The Holland court 
rejected Holland’s procedural due process argument under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
response to this challenge, the court noted that the CJRA includes (1) all of the “extensive 
safeguards” of the federal Bail Reform Act, which the Supreme Court held were more than 
constitutionally sufficient in Salerno, and (2) “the additional protection of extensive discovery” 
prior to the pretrial detention hearing, which the federal process did not provide.76 The Holland 
court also rejected the substantive due process challenge, holding that Holland did not adequately 
show that the rights to cash bail and corporate surety bond were deeply rooted in the nation’s 
                                                 
70 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 727 (1997) (emphasis added). 
71 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752–53; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (stating that unless the right to bail is preserved, 
“the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”); Carlson v. 
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a right to bail in all 
arrests). 
72 The criminal justice system extols the principle that individuals are presumed innocent until proven guilty. See 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895). While the Supreme Court has avoided the question of whether 
there is a fundamental right to bail, it has held that bail is not guaranteed in all arrests, suggesting that there is no 
fundamental right to bail. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 544–46. 
73 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018). 
74 Id. at 284. 
75 Id. at 278. 
76 Id. at 298. 
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history and tradition.77 In its opinion, the court explained that the original meaning of “bail” 
encompassed only a personal surety bail system,78 and that: 
. . . cash bail and corporate surety bond are not protected by 
substantive due process because they are neither sufficiently rooted 
historically nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Hence the 
[CJRA’s] subordination of monetary bail to non-monetary 
conditions of release need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
State interest. And it is—New Jersey’s interests in ensuring 
defendants appear in court, do not endanger the safety of any person 
or the community, or obstruct their criminal process, are no doubt 
legitimate.79  
 
The Third Circuit’s clear ruling rejecting the idea that bail is a fundamental right dashes any 
hopes bail advocates may have about invalidating bail reform legislation by way of substantive 
due process. Furthermore, on October 29, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
guaranteeing that the Third Circuit’s ruling would be the last word on the case.80 In light of this 
denial, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever choose to make a definitive ruling on 
the issue. Further, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari and the Third Circuit’s rejection of 
Holland’s due process challenges show that a due process challenge to SB 10 is not likely to be 
raised, nor is it likely to be successful. 
2. Eighth Amendment “Excessive Bail” Clause 
The Eighth Amendment provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”81 Opponents to 
SB 10 will likely argue that the Excessive Bail Clause provides a constitutional right to bail. 
However, there is a rigorous debate as to whether the Excessive Bail Clause incorporates a “right 
to bail” inherent in its proscription of excessive bail.82 Further, even assuming the Eighth 
                                                 
77 Id. at 295–96. 
78 Id. at 289. 
79 Id. at 296. 
80 Holland v. Rosen, 139 S. Ct. 440 (2018). 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
82 The majority of courts facing Eighth Amendment challenges to preventative detention have concluded that the 
Excessive Bail Clause does not grant an absolute right to bail. Overbeck, supra note 32, at 192 However, a handful 
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Amendment does provide a right to bail, no court has yet determined whether that right extends 
to monetary bail to be considered in line with non-monetary release conditions.83 As such, given 
these ambiguities, an Eighth Amendment challenge to SB 10 is not likely to be successful. 
In determining whether the Eighth Amendment provides a right to bail, a court first has to 
determine the definition of “excessive” bail; however, the Supreme Court has yet to define 
“excessiveness.”84 The Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Excessive Bail Clause is 
sparse and consists chiefly of two cases: Stack v. Boyle85 and Carlson v. Landon.86 In Stack,87 the 
Court rejected an excessive bail amount set for the purpose of preventing defendants from 
receiving bail. But although the Court defended the historic meaning of bail in Stack, it took an 
opposite view in Carlson v. Landon, holding that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a 
right to bail in all cases.88 Left with these conflicting rulings, the Eighth Amendment has not 
been a fruitful constitutional provision with which to challenge bail.89 
 Further, the weakness of an Eighth Amendment argument to a bail reform law can be 
seen in Holland v. Rosen, which involved an Eighth Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s 
CJRA.90 Holland argued that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail 
implicitly encompassed a right to monetary bail.91 The Third Circuit, in rejecting this argument, 
noted that (1) the concepts of cash bail or corporate security bonds did not exist when the Eighth 
                                                 
of courts have held that the Eighth Amendment does confer an absolute right to bail. Kevin F. Arthur, Preventive 
Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. REV. 378, 394 (1987); see, e.g., Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F.Supp. 53, 
58 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F.Supp. 483, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1960). 
83 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 2018).  
84 Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 1344, 1349 (2014). 
85 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).  
86 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952)  
87 342 U.S. at 7.. 
88 342 U.S. at 544-46. 
89 See Wiseman, supra note 84, at 1349. 
90 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2018). 
91 Id. at 285. 
 15 
Amendment was enacted,92 and (2) the modern understanding of “bail” developed in the 
twentieth century would include not only monetary bail, but also non-monetary conditions 
imposed under the CJRA that “enable[] accused persons ‘to stay out of jail until a trial has found 
them guilty.’”93 To pass muster under the Eighth Amendment, non-monetary conditions, like 
monetary bail, must not be “excessive in light of the perceived evil.”94 Noting that (1) the CJRA 
expressly required trial judges in New Jersey to impose the least restrictive conditions possible to 
achieve its goals, and (2) only “8.3% of eligible defendants” were subjected to “level 3+ home 
detention and electronic monitoring,” the Third Circuit found no indication that the non-
monetary conditions imposed on Holland or other eligible defendants were “excessive.”95 
3. State Constitutional Right to Bail 
The California Constitution contains two sections pertaining to bail: Article I, sections 12 
and 28(f)(3).96 These two sections govern pretrial release on bail and personal recognizance 
release.97 Few cases have addressed these constitutional provisions, and as a result, no definitive 
                                                 
92 Id. at 290.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 290 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)).  
95 Id. at 291–92. 
96 CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28(f)(3). 
97 California constitutional and statutory rights to bail are broader than federal rights. See Pen. Code § 1271; see also 
In re Underwood, 9 Cal.3d 345, 351 (1973) (“[I]t is clear that the Constitution of California prohibits the denial of 
bail solely because of petitioner’s dangerous propensities.”).  
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judicial interpretation exists regarding the differences between these two provisions.98 However, 
it is clear that the state constitution prohibits excessive bail.99 
Section 12 of the California Constitution states that “[a] person shall be released on bail 
by sufficient sureties,” with few offenses as exceptions.100 Section 12 “was intended to abrogate 
the common law rule that bail was a matter of judicial discretion by conferring an absolute right 
to bail except in a narrow class of cases.”101 This “provision ‘establishes a person’s right to 
obtain release on bail from pretrial custody, identifies certain categories of crime in which such 
bail is unavailable, prohibits the imposition of excessive bail as to other crimes, sets forth the 
factors a court shall take into consideration in fixing the amount of the required bail, and 
recognizes that a person ‘may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s 
discretion.’”102 Section 28 establishes and ensures enforcement of certain rights for victims of 
criminal acts,103 one of which is the right “[t]o have the safety of the victim and the victim’s 
                                                 
98 Pretrial Detention Reform, supra note 40, at 20. 
99 CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28(f)(3). Bail is not considered excessive merely because the defendant cannot post it. 
Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 661 (9th Cir. 2007); In re Burnette, 35 Cal.App.2d 358, 360–61 (1939). 
However, bail may not be set in an amount which is functionally no bail in a case where bail is mandated. Galen, 
477 F.3d at 661. The amount of bail may not be set solely to insure the defendant’s incarceration for improper 
reasons. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir. 1987).  
100 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. The offenses excluded from receiving bail are capital crimes and felony offenses 
involving acts of violence or sexual assault, both where the facts are evident or the presumption of guilt is great. Id. 
Another exception is any felony offense where the defendant has threatened another with great bodily harm and 
there is a substantial likelihood that the threat would be carried out if the person were released. Id. 
101 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).  
102 Id. (quoting In re York, 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1139–40 (1995). Section 12 provides in full: 
“A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for: 
(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great; 
(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on another 
person, when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and 
convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person's release would result in great bodily 
harm to others; or 
(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based on clear and 
convincing evidence that the person has threatened another with great bodily harm and that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the person would carry out the threat if released. 
Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her 
appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. 
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
103 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b). 
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family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for the defendant.”104 With 
respect to that victim’s right, Section 28(f)(3), entitled “Public Safety Bail,” provides that “[i]n 
setting, reducing or denying bail, . . . [p]ublic safety and the safety of the victim shall be the 
primary considerations.”105 
These sections of the California Constitution may pose the greatest legal threat to SB 10’s 
survival. Notably, as SB 10 eliminates cash bail, the law may be challenged on the grounds that 
it violates the California Constitution’s guarantee to an “absolute right to bail except in a narrow 
class of cases.”106 Indeed, members of the bail industry have already suggested this by claiming 
that SB 10 infringes on the state constitution’s positive right to bail.107 The best way to dodge 
such a challenge is by amending the state constitution. One state did just that in order to protect 
its bail reform law—New Jersey amended its constitution as a necessary addition to its 
enactment of the CJRA.108 New Jersey voters ultimately passed a constitutional amendment 
permitting the detention of high-risk defendants before trial.109 In a similar vein, the biggest step 
in support of SB 10 would be to follow New Jersey’s example and enact an amendment to the 
California Constitution to bring its bail provision in line with that of the Federal Constitution.110 
B. Policy Challenges to SB 10 
                                                 
104 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(3). 
105 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(3).  
106 Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (citations omitted). 
107 Blanca Garcia, Bail Industry Fights SB 10, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.independent.com/news/2018/oct/11/bail-industry-fights-sb-10/ [https://perma.cc/VY5X-N49E].  
108 Prior to the CJRA’s implementation, the New Jersey Constitution mandated the right to bail for all defendants, 
creating a paradoxical system where the state’s wealth-based bail system and the state constitution’s right to bail 
were in direct conflict. The Joint Committee on Criminal Justice, Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice, 
(New Jersey Judiciary, March 10, 2014), 2. 
109 New Jersey Legislature, Sen. Concurrent Res. No. 128 (July 10, 2014), 
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/SCR/128_I1.HTM [https://perma.cc/F49Y-TJJ3]. The amendment was passed in 
November 2014, three months after the passage of the CJRA.  See New Jersey Pretrial Detention Amendment, 
Public Question No. 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Pretrial_Detention_Amendment,_Public_Question_No._1_ (2014)#cite_note-
text-2 [https://perma.cc/3J2V-AB59]. 
110 The California Constitution provides that an amendment may be brought by public initiative or by referendum 
CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3. 
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 While legal challenges to the validity of SB 10 may not pose a danger to the law’s 
survival, policy challenges headed by the media and driven by the bail bondsman lobby pose a 
much bigger threat. Further, despite SB 10’s passage, California voters will weigh in on the 
future of SB 10.111 A coalition called Californians Against the Reckless Bail Scheme112 attained 
enough signatures to qualify for a referendum for the November 2020 ballot.113 As such, SB 10 
is placed on hold until 2020, giving the bail industry and other opponents more than a year to 
stop SB 10 for good.114 The bail industry is not the only opponent to SB 10—other critics include 
public defenders,115 the ACLU of California,116 Human Rights Watch,117 and lawmakers on both 
sides of the political spectrum.118 Their opposition to SB 10 spans a range of arguments and 
poses some important questions as to SB 10’s underlying policies. 
                                                 
111 Bryan Anderson & Alexei Koseff, Vacant governor’s mansion + Bail measure has the votes + California 
Priorities summit today, SACBEE (Nov. 9, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article221389490.html [https://perma.cc/MCT5-RYM4].. 
112 Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on the 2020 Ballot, 
SACBEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article224682595.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FS2-GWWY]. “‘We knew with the momentum against [SB 10] from people on all sides of the 
issue, getting on the ballot would not be the problem,’ Jeff Clayton, executive director of the American Bail 
Coalition, said in a prepared statement. ‘Now we can move on toward defeating this reckless law.’” Id. 
113 Anderson & Koseff, supra note 111; Garcia, supra note 107 “[A] referendum asks [California voters] whether 
they want to overturn a statute written by lawmakers.The bail industry would be asking voters to cast a “no” vote on 
the ultimate ballot measure to ensure [SB 10’s] defeat.” Ulloa, supra note 66.  
114 Anderson & Koseff, supra note 111. 
115 Scott Wilson, California Abolishes Cash Bail, Aiming to Treat Rich and Poor Defendants Equally, WASHINGTON 
POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/california-abolishes-cash-bail-aiming-to-treat-rich-
and-poor-defendants-equally/2018/08/29/70891a9e-abad-11e8-b1da-
ff7faa680710_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.28cb424391a3 [https://perma.cc/S28F-KECZ]. 
116 ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation, ACLU NORTHERN CALIF. (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-california-changes-position-oppose-bail-reform-legislation 
https://perma.cc/T3YX-PDV9]. 
117 Human Rights Watch Opposes California Senate Bill 10, The California Bail Reform Act, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/14/human-rights-watch-opposes-california-senate-bill-
10-california-bail-reform-act [https://perma.cc/9XFX-7N94]. 
118 State Senate candidate Shannon Grove, in opposition to SB 10, stated, “If you can’t afford bail, don’t commit a 
crime.” Grove, Fong Rally for Reform at Republican Women Luncheon, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Oct. 24, 2018), 
available at http://www.ridgecrestca.com/news/20181024/grove-fong-rally-for-reform-at-republican-women-
luncheon [https://perma.cc/MC6W-RL62]. Additionally, 34th District California Assemblyman Vince Fong stated in 
reference to SB 10, “ . . . when it comes to public safety, when it comes to our business climate, the things that are 
coming out of Sacramento are not making it better.” Id.  
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1. Is SB 10’s Judicial Discretion to Detain and Presumption of Detention 
Overly Broad? 
 
The original version of SB 10 stated its intent was to “safely reduce the number of people 
detained pretrial, while addressing racial and economic disparities in the pretrial 
system.”119 However, the amended SB 10 states only that its intent is to “permit preventive 
detention of pretrial defendants.”120 This change in SB 10 has sparked criticism that SB 10 uses 
broad language to create a system where judges have nearly unlimited discretion in ordering 
accused people to be held in preventative detention until their case is resolved.121 For instance, 
the ACLU of California argues that SB 10 “seeks to replace the current deeply-flawed system 
with an overly broad presumption of preventative detention.”122 This presumption is particularly 
overbroad when prosecutors are allowed to rely on hearsay at detention hearings.123 Essentially, 
the fear is that SB 10 will shift the burden to  defendants, rather than prosecutors, to prove that 
they should be released, regardless of risk scores.124 However, these claims are a vast 
overstatement of SB 10’s mandate. 
Under SB 10, at arraignment, defendants—even those deemed to be high-risk 
individuals—will never be held in preventative detention unless certain motions are made and 
granted by the court.124a First, the prosecution must file a motion for preventative detention.125 
For the judge to even order that the defendant be held in detention pending that detention 
                                                 
119 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), Section 2 (Dec. 5, 2016); Human Rights Watch Opposes 
California Senate Bill 10, supra note 117. 
120 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), Section 1 (amended September 6, 2017).  
121 Human Rights Watch Opposes California Senate Bill 10, supra note 117. 
122 ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation, supra note 116. 
123 See Human Rights Watch Opposes California Senate Bill 10, supra note 117.  
124  See Max Rivlin-Nadler, California Could Soon End Money Bail, But At What Cost?, THE APPEAL (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://theappeal.org/california-could-soon-end-money-bail-but-at-what-cost/. 
124a SB 10 General Overview, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California, 1 (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/sb10-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUZ8-W8FT]. 
125 Senate Bill No. 10, codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.18(a) (effective Oct. 1, 2019). 
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hearing, the judge must determine that there is a “substantial likelihood that no nonmonetary 
condition or combination of conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably . . . assure public 
safety.”126 Determining whether there is a substantial likelihood is an incredibly high standard to 
satisfy. However, if the judge does order preventative detention during that period, the detention 
hearing must be held within three days of the motion.127 
Second, the court may order the defendant into preventative detention only if the judge 
finds “by clear and convincing evidence that no nonmonetary condition or combination of 
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure public safety or the appearance of the 
defendant in court as required.”128 This determination requires a judge to find that every 
nonmonetary condition of release and every combination of conditions of release is insufficient 
in assuring the public safety or the defendant’s appearance in court. This is an incredibly difficult 
determination to make and would require significant time, money, and effort on behalf of the 
prosecution.  
As such, to order preventative detention, the judge not only has to reject every single 
condition of release for the defendant, but the judge also has to make this determination by “clear 
and convincing evidence,” a very high evidentiary legal standard to satisfy. As such, the fear 
should not be that there is an overly-broad presumption of detention that defendants must rebut, 
but rather that the possibility of releasing dangerous, high-risk defendants on conditions of 
release will rise significantly. SB 10 only creates a presumption of preventative detention—
which is still rebuttable—for a defendant under specific circumstances, such as if the crime is a 
                                                 
126 Id. at § 1320.18(d) (emphasis added). 
127 See id. at §1320.19(a). In the detention hearing, the defendant has a right to counsel and a right to testify. Id. at § 
1320.19(d). Additionally, the victim must be notified and provided with an opportunity for input. See id. at § 
1320.19(e). 
128 Id. at § 1320.20(d)(1). 
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violent felony or the defendant is deemed a high-risk to public safety.129 Further, if the court 
orders preventative detention, the judge must state the reasons for ordering preventative 
detention on the record.130 This requirement not only creates a transparent record of the judge’s 
decision, but it also makes it easier for defendants to appeal the judge’s preventative detention 
decision later on. 
Ultimately, the claim that SB 10 creates an overly-broad presumption of detention that 
every accused person must combat is an alarmist claim resulting from exaggeration and fear-
mongering. SB 10 is not attempting to give judges unlimited discretion in ordering preventative 
detention left and right. Rather, the law creates a carefully-constructed legal process, with 
multiple safeguards and high hurdles, for ordering preventative detention: the prosecution must 
take the time and effort to file a motion for preventative detention, a detention hearing must be 
held in a timely manner, and a judge must find that the state overcame the high “clear and 
convincing” evidentiary standard in proving that no nonmonetary conditions of release, or 
combinations thereof, would reasonably assure public safety or the defendant’s appearance in 
court.  
2. Is the Cost of Implementing and Funding PAS Too High? 
 
SB 10 establishes Pretrial Assessment Services (PAS), a program that is tasked with 
gathering information and using reports to aid judges in determining whether a defendant is a 
                                                 
129 See id. at § 1320.20(d)(1). There is a rebuttable presumption of detention if: “(1) The current crime is a violent 
felony . . . or was a felony offense committed with violence against a person, threatened violence, or with a 
likelihood of serious bodily injury, or one in which the defendant was personally armed with or personally used a 
deadly weapon or firearm in the commission of the crime, or . . . personally inflicted great bodily injury in the 
commission of the crime;” or (2) The person was assessed as high risk to public safety; and a) “was convicted of a 
serious or violent felony . . . within the past 5 years;” b) the defendant is pending sentencing on a serious or violent 
crime; c) the person has “intimidated, dissuaded, or threatened” the victim with retaliation; or d) the person “was on 
any form of postconviction supervision” except informal probation. Id. § 1320.20(a). 
130 Id.§ 1320.20(d)(1).   
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public-safety risk or a flight risk.131 PAS also recommend conditions of release as alternatives to 
pretrial detention. However, judges are not bound by the reports and recommendations of the 
PAS. Instead, PAS reports serve as tools to inform a judge’s pretrial detention decision. Judicial 
officers still have the ability to override the PAS recommendation, if necessary. In the previous 
bail system, judges were the final authority in the determination of pretrial release or pretrial 
detention. Under SB 10, judges have similar authority, but they are given a broader toolkit to use 
in making this decision. The role of PAS in supervising and monitoring released defendants 
simply encourages judges to impose conditions of release rather than preventative detention. As 
such, the implementation process of PAS is essential in order for PAS to effectively carry out its 
role.  
In order to adequately implement PAS, the program must be sufficiently researched, 
adequately funded, and carefully supervised. California’s SB 10 should generally model its 
implementation of SB 10 on New Jersey’s CJRA. The CJRA’s implementation process took a 
multiple-pronged approach: it focused on updating courtroom technology, creating pretrial 
service agencies to supervise defendants released pretrial, increasing court filing fees to cover the 
costs of the program, educating the public about the legislation, and training the different 
participants in the criminal justice system about their new roles in the administration of pretrial 
justice.132 In addition, New Jersey courtroom officials traveled to several jurisdictions in 
Arizona, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Colorado to learn more about using risk assessment tools 
within the bail system.133 To perfect the risk assessment tool prior to its widespread 
                                                 
131 SB 10: Pretrial Release and Detention, supra note 56 (under “Does SB 10, the pretrial reform legislation, mean a 
judge has less discretion to decide who to detain or release before trial?” in Frequently Asked Questions). 
132 Glenn A. Grant, Report to the Governor and Legislature 2015, Criminal Justice Reform (New Jersey Judiciary, 
December 2015), 1–2, https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/2015cjrannual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CMU-DE5R].   
133 Id. at 3.   
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dissemination, the New Jersey Judiciary validated the risk assessment instrument by using data 
from hundreds of thousands of cases and by testing the tool in a handful of counties.134 The 
judiciary then made minor adjustments to the instrument based on these experiences.135  
California should follow New Jersey’s procedures in implementing SB 10. However, in 
order to carry out a similar process of research and testing, California’s PAS and judiciary must 
first be adequately funded. It is at this point that bail reform opponents often interject with 
righteous pleas on behalf of the taxpayers of California.136 However, these concerns about 
funding are heavily exaggerated and overblown. In fact, pretrial services have been estimated to 
cost as little as $3 per day, while the cost of pretrial detention is as much as $85 per day.137 In 
Santa Clara County, California, which already uses a pretrial services program, pretrial services 
cost around $7 million per year, but the county has saved around $60 million from no longer 
detaining unconvicted defendants.138 As such, it is clear that conditions of release, such as 
reminders of court dates and programs allowing defendants to notify the court of illness or 
emergency preventing appearance, are more cost-effective than imposing pretrial detention.139  
Currently, California  spends more than $12 billion per year on state prisons, a 500 
percent increase in prison spending since 1981 that surpasses spending on education, health, and 
all other budget items.140 Thus, it is clear that allocating funds to pretrial services, rather than 
                                                 
134 Id. at 4. 
135 See id. 
136 See Garcia, supra note 107/. 
137 Whittney Evans, Virginia Might Be the Next State to Challenge Controversial Cash Bail System, COMMUNITY 
IDEA STATIONS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://ideastations.org/radio/news/virginia-might-be-next-state-challenge-
controversial-cash-bail-system [https://perma.cc/UB9Y-MRNN].  
138 Harrison, supra note 57, at 542. 
139 See Harmsworth, supra note 20, at 222. In one study, the Manhattan Bail Project mailed letters to the defendants 
in their native language to remind them of court dates, resulting in the extremely low 1.6% FTA (failure to appear) 
rate for Baltimore. See id. (citing Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use 
of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963)). 
140 Lenore Anderson, If California Wants Real Criminal Justice Reform, this is the Next Step, SACBEE (Oct. 24, 
2018), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article220511650.html [https://perma.cc/2GJV-34CA].  
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prisons and pretrial detention of defendants, would save millions in taxpayer money in the long 
run. However, this fact will likely do nothing to stop bail reform opponents from launching 
vehement opposition campaigns.141 
Ultimately, an adequately-funded PAS is crucial to the success of SB 10’s bail reform 
efforts and to the administration of non-monetary release conditions as an alternative to 
preventative detention. Despite the implementation and start-up costs that PAS will inevitably 
require, the use of pretrial services is more cost-effective than not using them. As such, the long-
term financial outlook favors the use of pretrial services despite the implementation costs 
necessary to start such services. 
3. Are the Risk Assessments in SB 10 Discriminatory? 
Under SB 10, within twelve hours of booking, the booking agency, usually the sheriff, 
will release defendants arrested for misdemeanors (with some exceptions for domestic violence, 
stalking, and other serious factors).142 Within twenty-four hours of booking, Pretrial Assessment 
Services (“PAS”) will assess all individuals who have not been released by the booking 
agency—defendants charged with felonies or with misdemeanors where, under an exception, 
they cannot be released on recognizance.143 PAS will conduct “prearraignment reviews” for 
these individuals using a validated risk assessment instrument, and PAS will inform the booking 
agency of eligible low-risk and medium-risk individuals who may be immediately released 
                                                 
141 For example, in opposition to New Jersey’s CJRA, the American Bail Coalition paid researchers at Towson 
University $25,000 to conduct a study on the costs of the CJRA, with a specific focus on the pretrial services unit 
created under the law. Joe Hernandez, Who is losing out under New Jersey’s criminal justice changes? Bail 
bondsmen, WHYY (Dec. 29, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/who-is-losing-out-under-new-jerseys-criminal-justice-
reforms-bail-bondsmen/ [https://perma.cc/S4AW-PN3K]. The report, published in 2014, estimated that the CJRA 
would cost almost $66 million in its first year. However, the Towson study was “requested and paid for by the bail 
bond industry,” leading to questions about the dubious incentives of the study’s funders. Id. Similar vehement 
opposition campaigns can be expected to arise in response to SB 10. However, the likelihood of success of such 
campaigns is unclear, depending largely on the public’s perception of SB 10. 
142 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.8 (effective October 1, 2019). 
143 See id. at §1320.9(a). 
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without a court appearance.144 Individuals who are assessed as high-risk must be held until 
arraignment (within forty-eight hours of arrest).145 Release decisions for these individuals will be 
made by the court.146 Prior to arraignment, PAS will provide risk assessment information and 
other information to the courts, including any recommendations for conditions of release.147 
Courts may choose to perform their own pre-arraignment review under certain enumerated 
circumstances.148 If courts choose this route, judicial officers may order the release of additional 
low and medium risk defendants prior to arraignment after receiving information from PAS, 
including the results of a risk assessment.149 
Given SB 10’s reliance on risk assessments, concerns have been raised about these 
validated risk assessment instruments, which may consider factors such as race and other 
demographic factors that have the ability to inappropriately affect risk assessment scores.150 Over 
one hundred prominent social justice and civil rights organizations, many of which are leaders in 
advocating for the reform and abolition of monetary bail systems, have condemned such risk 
assessment tools.151 Detractors claim that risk assessments are “like a factory machine that 
funnels people,” rather than “address[ing] the root cause of an issue.”152 
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 Despite these concerns, risk assessment tools are often utilized as objective bases to 
release defendants on their own recognizance or with limited pretrial conditions.153 Further, risk 
assessment tools have actually been shown to help decrease overall rates of pretrial detention. 
Indeed, in a 2012 study, researchers analyzed data on 116,000 defendants from 1990 to 2006 and 
found that if judges had released all low-risk defendants, or those with less than a 30 percent 
chance of being rearrested during the pretrial period, 85 percent of pretrial defendants would 
have been released.154 
However, SB 10’s use of risk assessment tools may give rise to various legal challenges. 
In this, there is very little judicial guidance on the constitutional implications of risk assessment 
tools, and the cases that have examined issues related to risk assessments have not arisen in the 
pretrial context.155 Therefore, depending on how the tools are used, substantial constitutional 
considerations may come into play. For instance, a challenge to SB 10 may attack its use of risk 
assessments on the ground that these statistical tools rely on aggregate data, thereby undermining 
“individualized and equal justice.”156 One could argue that risk assessments disproportionately 
impact minority groups.157 Indeed, many critics assert that by relying on underlying factors that 
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are molded and skewed by race or gender discrimination, risk assessment tools actually reinforce 
and strengthen discrimination and inequality.158  
For example, risk assessments often consider a defendant’s prior interaction with the 
criminal justice system as an objective factor.159 However, the lens through which this factor is 
viewed may itself be twisted by discrimination—discrimination that caused African Americans 
and Latinos to be disproportionately exposed to law enforcement in the first place.160 Similarly, 
factors such as educational history, housing instability, or other socioeconomic factors are likely 
to result in racial disparities because these factors correlate strongly with race.161 As such, factors 
deemed to be objective may not, in fact, be objective at all. Using this same logic, SB 10’s use of 
risk assessments may appear to entrench and exacerbate existing racial and socioeconomic 
disparities by giving a “scientific imprimatur” to unequal outcomes.162 If this is the case, how 
can the use of any risk assessment tool pass constitutional muster? 
To pass constitutional scrutiny, a risk assessment tool that determines or influences 
pretrial outcomes must conform to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.163 
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However, even though equal protection principles generally prohibit express classifications 
based on race or sex, or intentional discrimination on those bases, the Constitution does not 
prohibit policies that have an unintentional disparate impact on particular groups, even if those 
disparities are foreseeable.164 Factors such as prior criminal history, educational history, or 
housing instability are not express classifications based on race or sex. But even though these 
factors present as facially neutral, they may have an unintended disparate impact on certain 
minority groups. Nevertheless, because this impact is unintentional, the use of these factors is 
constitutionally permissible. As such, an equal protection challenge to the use of risk 
assessments in SB 10 would likely fail because there is no mandate in SB 10 that requires the 
tool to use an express classification based on race or sex, or to intentionally discriminate on those 
bases.165 Rather, SB 10 merely authorizes courts to consider “[t]he recommendation of Pretrial 
Assessment Services obtained using a validated risk assessment instrument.”166 The law does not 
mandate what specific factors are to be used by the risk assessments instruments.167 Individual 
county risk assessments could be challenged on the grounds that the underlying factors violate 
equal protection, but SB 10 itself could not successfully be challenged because it does not 
specifically mandate the use of discriminatory factors.  
Opponents of risk assessments also argue that the very premise of a risk assessment 
tool—a tool that draws on “aggregate data to make decisions about individuals”168—violates 
fundamental norms of fairness and due process. While an individual’s conduct is within that 
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individual’s control, that individual has no control over others who share  a characteristic 
relevant for the risk assessment instrument.169 How then can an individual be judged simply by 
looking at the aggregate conduct of thousands of other people? 
 The Constitution’s due process protections require that, before the government deprives a 
person of liberty, that person must enjoy sufficient procedural safeguards that “minimize 
substantively unfair or mistaken” outcomes.170 The main features of such procedural safeguards 
are reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.171 In the pretrial context, the Salerno Court 
emphasized that the procedural due process inquiry for a preventative detention decision turns on 
whether a defendant enjoys “procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of 
future dangerousness [that] are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that 
determination.”172 As such, an SB 10 challenger could argue that the Constitution requires the 
Salerno procedural due process principles to be reflected in any procedure that relies on risk 
assessments. Essentially, this argument asserts that a defendant must have an opportunity to 
contest any potentially inaccurate or substantively unfair risk assessment procedures. This broad 
argument ultimately leaves all risk assessment tools vulnerable to due process challenges on the 
ground that the tools have the capacity to produce inaccurate or unfair results. However, having 
the capacity to produce inaccurate or unfair results is markedly different from actually producing 
inaccurate or unfair results, and the success of such a challenge turns on this distinction. 
There is currently no case law that illustrates a definition or standard for what constitutes 
inaccurate or unfair risk assessment results. However, case law in other legal areas suggests 
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some ways that jurisdictions could ensure adequate procedures.173 For instance, in the sentencing 
context, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the use of a risk assessment instrument, outlining 
several requirements for applying the tool consistently with due process. In State v. Loomis, 
Loomis argued that the risk assessment tool violated his due process rights to be sentenced on 
accurate individualized information. First, he contended that the risk assessment tool placed him 
within a group and assessed risk based on certain shared characteristics with others in that group. 
Thus, there was a danger of overestimating the risk of an individual defendant based on limited 
information. It is the character of the offender that the court must consider, Loomis argued, not 
the class of people with whom he is similar.174  
Loomis also asserted that because it was not disclosed how his risk scores were 
determined or how the factors were weighed, he had been denied information that the Circuit 
Court considered at sentencing.175 Unless Loomis could review how the factors were weighed 
and how the risk scores were determined, he claimed the accuracy of the risk assessment tool 
could not be verified and therefore it violated his due process rights. The court rejected his 
arguments, stating that even though Loomis could not review and challenge how the risk 
assessment algorithm calculated risk, he could at least review and challenge the resulting risk 
scores set forth in the report. The court concluded this, despite acknowledging that studies of risk 
assessment tools have raised questions about the accuracy of such tools. 
The Loomis court held that risk scores may not be considered the determinative factor in 
deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the community.176 The 
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court further held that sentencing judges considering risk reports must receive an accompanying 
advisory alerting them to four points: (1) that the company that created the tool has invoked its 
proprietary interest to prevent disclosure of how factors are weighted or risk scores are 
determined; (2) that risk assessment scores are based on group data and are able to identify 
groups of high-risk offenders, not a particular high risk offender; (3) that some studies of the tool 
being used have “raised questions about whether they disproportionately classify minority 
offenders as having a higher risk of recidivism”; and (4) that the tool is based on a national 
sample that has not been validated for Wisconsin and that risk assessment tools must be 
constantly monitored and re-calibrated for accuracy as the population changes.177 
In the pretrial detention context, courts have held that there should be safeguards in place 
to protect the weighty liberty interests of a defendant because presumptively innocent defendants 
face a deprivation of liberty.178 In the case of bail reform laws and SB 10, these safeguards 
should include a variation of the four Loomis factors, thereby providing an adequate advisory for 
judges to consider with regard to these risk assessment tools. These safeguards would essentially 
ensure that the defendant is provided with a substantive understanding of how the risk 
assessment tool works, and the defendant should be given a meaningful opportunity to contest 
the tool’s application, if necessary. The best way to ensure that these procedural safeguards are 
implemented uniformly throughout California is for SB 10 to provide that the safeguards must 
include: “disclosing the defendant’s risk assessment score, the factors considered in determining 
the score, the relative weights given to different factors, and information about when and how 
the instrument was validated and re-normed, including information about the population samples 
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used in validating it.”179 However, an adequate implementation of these procedural safeguards 
depends on the strength and efficiency of each county’s PAS. 
An efficient PAS would have the power to regulate the procedural framework that 
ensures that relevant information about a risk assessment’s accuracy is disclosed. PAS may do 
this by conducting and researching studies demonstrating race disparities or other inaccuracies 
caused by risk assessments in that county, and by setting out distinct limitations for the role that 
the tool may play in shaping pretrial decisions. Because SB 10 allows each county in California 
to choose its own validated risk assessment, it is up to the PAS of each county to determine the 
manner in which they conduct their pretrial assessments and use their risk assessment tools.191a 
This individualization of risk assessment tools allows each county to tailor its risk assessments 
tool and PAS pre-arraignment practices to meet that county’s specific needs. 
However, despite the advantages to giving counties this power, critics argue that SB 10 
vests these counties with too much discretion in deciding what risk assessment tools to use and 
how exactly they should be used, especially since SB 10 does not require that the same risk 
assessment be implemented throughout the state.191b While such concerns have some validity, it 
is an exaggeration to claim that SB 10 vests counties with a new type of power to choose in this 
area. Indeed, counties have always had this power to some extent. For instance, a 2015 survey of 
counties indicated that 46 of the 58 California counties already use some type of pretrial 
program, and that 70 percent established their programs in the past five years.180 Further, at least 
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42 counties use a type of pretrial risk assessment tool that provides judges with information 
about the risk of releasing a defendant before trial.181 
III. THE BIG PICTURE: A CONUNDRUM FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
 
 Given SB 10’s various advantages and weaknesses, the criminal justice system is faced 
with a conundrum: should it implement SB 10 and fund the various PAS programs necessary to 
administer SB 10, or should SB 10 be repealed, thereby maintaining the current wealth-based 
bail system despite the many known consequences for both individual rights and society? SB 10 
represents a new door that has not yet been opened—it is both hopeful and foreboding. Will it 
achieve its goals, or open Pandora’s box to even more bail problems? And is the possibility of 
facing new and unexpected problems really threatening enough to forgo SB 10 altogether? This 
dichotomy is one that has long-plagued criminal justice reform advocates.  
A. Conditions of Pretrial Detention: A Thirteenth Amendment Case Study 
An illustration of the plight of the pretrial detainee and the conditions of pretrial detention 
starts with the Thirteenth Amendment.182 The Thirteenth Amendment, the language of which has 
garnered attention recently,183 guarantees that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”184 In the pretrial detention context, at 
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least one court has recently determined that certain conditions of pretrial detention could violate 
the Thirteenth Amendment.185  
In McGarry v. Pallito, McGarry was denied bail and ordered into pretrial detention, 
where he was required to work in the prison laundry for long hours, sometimes fourteen-hour 
shifts, in hot, unsanitary conditions.186 When he objected to this work, he was told that his refusal 
would put him in either administrative segregation or “in the hole,”187 and that he would receive 
an Inmate Disciplinary Report, which could affect when sentenced inmates were eligible for 
release.188 The Second Circuit found that even though McGarry was a pretrial detainee, he was 
threatened by physical and legal coercion to work, and therefore he had stated a claim that 
sufficiently alleged that his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude 
was violated.189 
Thirteenth Amendment challenges may arise in other forms as well, depending on the 
circumstances of the pretrial detention. McGarry contemplated rehabilitation during 
incarceration and stated that, “it is clearly established that a state may not ‘rehabilitate’ pretrial 
detainees. The Supreme Court has unambiguously and repeatedly held that a state’s authority 
over pretrial detainees is limited by the Constitution in ways that the treatment of convicted 
persons is not.”190 And in McGinnis v. Royster, the Supreme Court concluded that “it would 
hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake in the pretrial detention period programs to 
rehabilitate a man still clothed with a presumption of innocence.”191 Further, in Bell v. Wolfish, 
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the Supreme Court held that convicted prisoners retain constitutional protections during 
incarceration, and the Court reasoned that “[a] fortiori, pretrial detainees, who have not been 
convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed 
by convicted prisoners.”192 
Considering these rulings, the current bail system and its overuse of pretrial detention—
especially for individuals who are detained because they simply cannot afford to pay their bail 
amounts—raises significant concerns about the criminal justice system’s view of the 
presumption of innocence in America. How can it be in accordance with the Constitution to 
subject a man “clothed with a presumption of innocence”193 to pretrial detention? A pretrial 
detainee—someone who has not yet been convicted of any crime—is given “at least those 
constitutional rights . . . enjoyed by convicted prisoners.”194 But under the presumption of 
innocence, shouldn’t the constitutional protections include much more than that? The Supreme 
Court has not given much direction on this issue, and the pretrial detainee is thus left in an 
ambiguous constitutional void in which they are put in pretrial detention by a wealth-based bail 
system, treated as convicted detainees by the criminal justice system, and condemned as 
criminals by the public. 
California’s SB 10 is an attempt to fill this void. It seeks to create a presumption of 
release for all low-risk defendants, construct a careful legal process for ordering preventative 
detention, and allow more instances of release on conditions as an alternative to pretrial 
detention. Yet, despite the nobility of this pursuit, SB 10 also generates a new kind of threat: the 
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creation of a bail system that is potentially worse, and potentially more dangerous to individual 
rights, than the previous one. 
B. Opening Pandora’s Box to a Potentially Worse Bail System 
 In any reform attempt, there is always a possibility that eradicating the old way will result 
in a new status quo that is significantly worse. SB 10 seeks to reform the bail system by allowing 
courts to release more defendants by imposing conditions of release as an alternative to pretrial 
detention. However, will SB 10’s use of conditions of release replace the current practice of 
pretrial incarceration with a new regime of “e-carceration”?195 Furthermore, which practice poses 
a bigger threat to individuals? These questions have recently come to the forefront of the SB 10 
bail reform policy debate.196 
In a regime of “e-carceration,” if a pretrial detainee is released prior to trial, a court may 
impose restrictive conditions of release that essentially create an “open-air digital prison.”197 For 
instance, a court may release a defendant pretrial, but it may order that the defendant wear an 
electronic-monitoring ankle device with GPS tracking—a condition that seems reasonable on its 
face and appears much less restrictive than pretrial detention. However, that ankle device costs 
the defendant around $300 each month in out-of-pocket expenses, and it severely restricts the 
defendant’s permitted zones of movement, making it hard to keep a job, attend classes, or care 
for children.198 Ultimately, even though that defendant is released from physical pretrial 
detention, she remains confined in a prison of e-carceration. She can live in her own home, yet 
she is stuck in a web of restrictive conditions and she is constantly monitored by an all-seeing 
technological spider. In an era where foreign governments have the ability to hack into national 
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elections199 and Facebook has the audacity to sell its customers’ private data,200 the prospect of 
giving the government, or government contractors, unfettered access to a person’s whereabouts 
is a frightening one. However, challenging these conditions of release in court has seen little 
success.  
In Holland v. Rosen, Holland claimed that the conditions of his pretrial release were 
unconstitutional because they violated the Fourth Amendment.201 In response, the Third Circuit 
assumed, without explicitly deciding, that home detention and electronic monitoring could 
constitute a search and seizure, but nevertheless found no violation because (1) Holland has a 
reduced expectation of privacy because he was arrested on probable cause for a dangerous 
offense, and (2) the State “has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes 
are available for trials” and a “‘legitimate and compelling’ interest in preventing crime by 
arrestees.”202  
On the issue of conditions of release, the Holland ruling is somewhat troubling. Even if a 
court finds that there is probable cause for a crime, does a defendant’s reduced expectation of 
privacy amount to having no expectation of privacy at all? After all, that is what electronic-ankle 
monitoring constitutes—a complete lack of privacy for an unconvicted, and presumably 
innocent, defendant. A GPS-tracking device allows the government to track an individual’s every 
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movement for the purpose of ensuring their appearance at court. However, would not a less-
intrusive condition of release have sufficed to ensure this outcome? The answer is almost 
certainly yes. Having PAS monitor the defendant by conducting weekly check-ins, either by 
phone or in person, would allow the government to keep track of the defendant, while also 
ensuring the defendant appears in court. There are numerous other conditions of release that 
would produce the same result. 
SB 10 provides measures to guard against intrusions into individual privacy by 
mandating that courts use the least-restrictive conditions of release available. Under SB 10, 
individuals who are assessed as low-risk during a pre-arraignment review will be released on 
their own recognizance by PAS and the booking agency within twenty-four hours of booking 
(exceptions for those arrested for crimes such as domestic violence, multiple DUI offenses, and 
other factors).203 Based upon the parameters set forth in state and local rules of court, individuals 
who are assessed as medium-risk (except for those arrested for crimes such as domestic violence, 
multiple DUIs, and other factors) will be released by PAS and the booking agency with the least 
restrictive nonmonetary conditions of release, such as supervision by PAS, GPS monitoring, or 
drug testing, that will ensure public safety and return to court.204 Further, SB 10 provides that 
defendants will not be required to pay for these nonmonetary conditions of release.205 As such, 
although the threat of an “e-carceration” regime is ever-present, SB 10 consciously seeks to 
safeguard against it. 
CONCLUSION 
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California’s bail system not only infringes on individual rights, but also exacerbates a 
cobweb criminal justice system. The In re Humphrey court framed the issue perfectly when it 
stated that the problem with the bail system stems “from the enduring unwillingness of our 
society, including the courts, to correct a deformity in our criminal justice system that close 
observers have long considered a blight on the system.”206 California sought to rectify this 
“deformity”207 of a wealth-based bail system by passing SB 10.  
While legal arguments contending that SB 10 violates the state constitutional right to bail 
may be entertained, these arguments have a low likelihood of success. However, legislation 
alone does not ensure success; rather, SB 10 needs adequate funding and research to effectively 
implement PAS programs throughout California’s counties.208 A carefully-constructed 
implementation plan, akin to New Jersey’s plan for the CJRA, is essential to SB 10’s success. If 
SB 10 is not properly implemented, funded, researched, and supervised, it will almost certainly 
increase the number of pretrial detainees and possibly even create a new regime of “e-
carceration” in California.209  
It is clear that bail reforms are inextricably linked to the de-carceration strategies 
underpinning them, but if SB 10’s de-carceration strategy is simply to replace one form of 
incarceration with another—“e-carceration”—then this bail reform will inevitably fail. It would 
satisfy some immediate problems, but would also create more problems in the future. This 
infinite cycle of problems and solutions ultimately stems from the nature of America’s cobweb 
justice system, in which the true roots of crime go much deeper to include mental health crises, 
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substance abuse, unaddressed trauma, housing and economic instability, and discriminatory 
police practices.210 However, looking at previous bail reform examples, SB 10 shows significant 
promise in reforming one piece of California’s criminal justice system. It may not be clear 
whether the answer to bail reform lies behind the SB 10 door, or if reformers are simply 
knocking on the door from the inside, but what is clear is that the current bail system is not 
working. It discriminates on the basis of wealth, it takes advantage of the criminal justice system 
for capitalist gain, and it profits none but the bail bond industry. Thus, SB 10 may have flaws, 
but it is a hopeful step forward in reforming California’s bail practices and in creating a fairer 
and more equitable criminal justice system. 
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